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Abstract
Adversarial attacks against machine learning
models have threatened various real-world ap-
plications such as spam filtering and senti-
ment analysis. In this paper, we propose
a novel framework, learning to discriminate
perturbations (DISP), to identify and adjust
malicious perturbations, thereby blocking ad-
versarial attacks for text classification models.
To identify adversarial attacks, a perturbation
discriminator validates how likely a token in
the text is perturbed and provides a set of po-
tential perturbations. For each potential per-
turbation, an embedding estimator learns to re-
store the embedding of the original word based
on the context and a replacement token is cho-
sen based on approximate kNN search. DISP
can block adversarial attacks for any NLP
model without modifying the model structure
or training procedure. Extensive experiments
on two benchmark datasets demonstrate that
DISP significantly outperforms baseline meth-
ods in blocking adversarial attacks for text
classification. In addition, in-depth analysis
shows the robustness of DISP across different
situations.
1 Introduction
Deep learning techniques (Goodfellow et al.,
2016) have achieved enormous success in many
fields, such as computer vision and NLP. How-
ever, complex deep learning models are often sen-
sitive and vulnerable to a tiny modification. In
other words, malicious attackers can destroy the
models by adding a few inconspicuous perturba-
tions into input data, such as masking images with
unrecognizable filters and making low-key mod-
ifications for texts. Therefore, developing tech-
niques to equip models against adversarial attacks
becomes a prominent research problem.
∗Equal contribution. Listing order is random.
Existing studies on adversarial attacks can be
classified into two groups, generation of adversar-
ial examples and defense against adversarial at-
tacks (Yuan et al., 2019). In the field of NLP, most
of the existing studies focus on the former. For
example, Ebrahimi et al. (2017); Alzantot et al.
(2018) replace a word with synonyms or simi-
lar words while Gao et al. (2018); Liang et al.
(2017); Ebrahimi et al. (2017) conduct character-
level manipulations to fool the models. More-
over, it is not straightforward to adapt existing
approaches for blocking adversarial attacks, such
as data augmentation (Krizhevsky et al., 2012;
Ribeiro et al., 2018; Ren et al., 2019) and adversar-
ial training (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Iyyer et al.,
2018; Marzinotto et al., 2019; Cheng et al., 2019;
Zhu et al., 2019), to NLP applications. Hence, the
defense against adversarial attacks in NLP remains
a challenging and unsolved problem.
Recognizing and removing the inconspicuous
perturbations are the core of defense against ad-
versarial attacks. For instance, in computer vi-
sion, denoising auto-encoders (Warde-Farley and
Bengio, 2017; Gu and Rigazio, 2015) are applied
to remove the noises introduced by perturbations;
Prakash et al. (2018) manipulate the images to
make the trained models more robust to the pertur-
bations; Samangouei et al. (2018) apply generative
adversarial networks to generate perturbation-free
images. However, all of these approaches can-
not straightforwardly apply to the NLP tasks for
the following two reasons. First, images consist
of continuous pixels while texts are discrete to-
kens. As a result, a token can be replaced with
another semantically similar token that drops the
performance, so perturbations with natural looks
cannot be easily recognized compared to previ-
ous approaches that capture unusual differences
between the intensities of neighboring pixels. Sec-
ond, sentences consist of words with an enormous
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vocabulary size, so it is intractable to enumerate
all of the possible sentences. Therefore, existing
defense approaches in computer vision that rely
on pixel intensities cannot be directly used for the
NLP tasks.
After recognizing the perturbed tokens, the
naı¨ve way to eliminate the perturbations for block-
ing adversarial attacks is to remove these per-
turbed tokens. However, removing words from
sentences results in fractured sentences, caus-
ing the performance of NLP models to degrade.
Therefore, it is essential to recover the removed
tokens. Nevertheless, training a satisfactory lan-
guage model requires myriad and diverse training
data, which is often unavailable. An inaccurate
language model that incoherently patches missing
tokens can further worsen the prediction perfor-
mance. To tackle this difficult challenge, we pro-
pose to recover the tokens from discriminated per-
turbations by a masked language model objective
with contextualized language modeling.
In this paper, we propose Learning to
Discriminate Perturbations (DISP), as a frame-
work for blocking adversarial attacks in NLP.
More specifically, we aim to defend the model
against adversarial attacks without modifying the
model structure and the training procedure. DISP
consists of three components, perturbation dis-
criminator, embedding estimator, and hierarchi-
cal navigable small world graphs. Given a per-
turbed testing data, the perturbation discrimina-
tor first identifies a set of perturbed tokens. For
each perturbed token, the embedding estimator op-
timized with a corpus of token embeddings infers
an embedding vector to represent its semantics.
Finally, we conduct an efficient kNN search over a
hierarchical taxonomy to translate each of the em-
bedding vectors into appropriate token to replace
the associated perturbed word. We summarize our
contributions in the following.
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the
first work for blocking adversarial attacks in
NLP without retraining the model.
• We propose a novel framework, DISP, which
is effective and significantly outperforms other
baseline methods in defense against adversarial
attacks on two benchmark datasets.
• Comprehensive experiments have been con-
ducted to demonstrate the improvements of
DISP. In addition, we will release our imple-
mentations and the datasets to provide a testbed
and facilitate future research in this direction.
2 Related Work
Adversarial examples crafted by malicious attack-
ers expose the vulnerability of deep neural net-
works when they are applied to down-streaming
tasks, such as image recognition, speech process-
ing, and text classifications (Wang et al., 2019;
Goodfellow et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017).
For adversarial attacks, white-box attacks have
full access to the target model while black-box at-
tacks can only explore the models by observing the
outputs with limited trials. Ebrahimi et al. (2017)
propose a gradient-based white-box model to at-
tack character-level classifiers via an atomic flip
operation. Small character-level transformations,
such as swap, deletion, and insertion, are applied
on critical tokens identified with a scoring strat-
egy (Gao et al., 2018) or gradient-based compu-
tation (Liang et al., 2017). Samanta and Mehta
(2017); Alzantot et al. (2018) replace words with
semantically and syntactically similar adversarial
examples.
However, limited efforts have been done on
adversarial defense in the NLP fields. Texts as
discrete data are sensitive to the perturbations
and cannot transplant most of the defense tech-
niques from the image processing domain such
as Gaussian denoising with autoencoders (Meng
and Chen, 2017; Gu and Rigazio, 2014). Adver-
sarial training is the prevailing counter-measure
to build a robust model (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Iyyer et al., 2018; Marzinotto et al., 2019; Cheng
et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2019) by mixing adversar-
ial examples with the original ones during training
the model. However, these adversarial examples
can be detected and deactivated by a genetic algo-
rithm (Alzantot et al., 2018). This method also re-
quires retraining, which can be time and cost con-
suming for large-scale models.
Spelling correction (Mays et al., 1991; Islam
and Inkpen, 2009) and grammar error correc-
tion (Sakaguchi et al., 2017) are useful tools which
can block editorial adversarial attacks, such as
swap and insertion. However, they cannot handle
cases where word-level attacks that do not cause
spelling and grammar errors. In our paper, we pro-
pose a general schema to block both word-level
and character-level attacks.
3 DISP for Blocking Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we first formally define the goal
of adversarial defense and then introduce the pro-
posed framework DISP, learning to discriminate
perturbations, for blocking adversarial attacks.
Problem Statement. Given an NLP model F (X),
where X = {t1, . . . , tN} is the input text of N
tokens while ti indicates the i-th token. A mali-
cious attacker can add a few inconspicuous pertur-
bations into the input text and generate an adver-
sarial example Xa so that F (X) 6= F (Xa) with
unsatisfactory prediction performance. For exam-
ple, a perturbation can be an insertion, a deletion
of a character in a token, a replacement of a token
with its synonym. In this paper, we aim to block
adversarial attacks for general text classification
models. More specifically, we seek to preserve the
model performances by recovering original input
text and universally improve the robustness of any
text classification model.
3.1 Framework Overview
Figure 1 illustrates the overall schema of the pro-
posed framework. DISP consists of three compo-
nents, (1) a perturbation discriminator, (2) an em-
bedding estimator, and (3) a token embedding cor-
pus with the corresponding small world graphs G.
In the training phase, DISP constructs a corpus D
from the original corpus for training the perturba-
tion discriminator so that it is capable of recog-
nizing the perturbed tokens. The corpus of token
embeddings C is then applied to train the embed-
ding estimator to recover the removed tokens after
establishing the small world graphs G of the em-
bedding corpus. In the prediction phase, for each
token in testing data, the perturbation discrimina-
tor predicts if the token is perturbed. For each po-
tential perturbation that is potentially perturbed,
the embedding estimator generates an approxi-
mate embedding vector and retrieve the token with
the closest distance in the embedding space for to-
ken recovery. Finally, the recovered testing data
can be applied for prediction. Note that the pre-
diction model can be any NLP model.Moreover,
DISP is a general framework for blocking adver-
sarial attacks, so the model selection for the dis-
criminator and estimator can also be flexible.
3.2 Perturbation Discrimination
Perturbation Discriminator. The perturbation
discriminator plays an important role to classify
whether a token ti in the input Xa is perturbed
based on its neighboring tokens. We adopt contex-
tualized language modeling, such as BERT (De-
vlin et al., 2018), to derive d-dimension contex-
tualized token representation TDi for each token
ti and then cascade it with a binary logistic re-
gression classifier to predict if the token ti is per-
turbed or not. Figure 2 illustrates the perturbation
discriminator based on a contextualized word en-
coder. The discriminator classifies a token ti into
two classes {0, 1} with logistic regression based
on the contextual representation TDi to indicate if
the token is perturbed. More formally, for each to-
ken ti, the discriminator predictions ri can then be
derived as:
ri = argmax
c
yci = argmax
c
(
wc · TDi + bc
)
,
where yci is the logit for the class c; wc and bc
are the weights and the bias for the class c. Fi-
nally, the potential perturbations R is the set of to-
kens with positive discriminator predictions R =
{ti | ri = 1}.
3.3 Efficient Token-level Recovery with
Embedding Estimator
After predicting the perturbations R, we need to
correct these disorders to preserve the prediction
performance. One of the most intuitive approaches
to recover tokens with context is to exploit lan-
guage models. However, language models require
sufficient training data while the precision to exact
tokens can be dispensable for rescuing prediction
performance. Moreover, over-fitting limited train-
ing data can be harmful to the prediction quality.
To resolve this problem, we assume that replac-
ing the perturbed word with a word with similar
meanings to the original word is sufficient for the
downstream models to make the correct predic-
tion. Based on the assumption, DISP first predicts
the embeddings of the recovered tokens for the po-
tential perturbations with an embedding estimator
based on context tokens. The tokens can then be
appropriately recovered by an efficient k-nearest
neighbors (kNN) search in the embedding space
of a token embedding corpus C.
Embedding Estimator. Similar to the perturba-
tion discriminator, any regression model can be
employed as an embedding estimator based on the
proposed concept. Here we adopt the contextu-
alized language modeling again as an example of
the embedding estimator. For each token ti, the
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Figure 1: Schema of the proposed framework DISP.
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Figure 2: The illustration of the perturbation discrimi-
nator in DISP.
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Figure 3: The illustration of the embedding estimator
in DISP with a window size 2w+1 for the token at the
position i.
contextualized token embedding can be derived as
a d-dimensional contextual representation vector
TGi to be features for estimating appropriate em-
beddings.
Figure 3 shows the embedding estimator based
on BERT. For each potential perturbation ti ∈ R,
2w neighboring tokens are selected as the context
for estimating the appropriate embedding, where
w decides the window size. More precisely, a seg-
ment of tokens with a window size 2w + 1 from
ti−w to ti+w is the input tokens for BERT, where ti
is replaced with a [MASK] token as the perturbed
position. Finally, for the target ti, a weight matrix
WG ∈ Rd×k projects the contextual representa-
tion TGi to a k-dimensional estimated embedding
ei as follows:
ei = T
G
i W
G,
where the dimension size k is required to be con-
sistent with the embedding dimension in the token
embedding corpus C.
Efficient Token-level Recovery. Finally, we re-
cover the input sentence based on the predicted re-
cover embeddings from the embedding estimator.
Specifically, the input text X needs to be recov-
ered from the perturbed text Xa by fixing token-
level perturbations based on its approximate em-
beddings.
Given the token embedding corpus C, it is
simple to transform an embedding to a token by
finding the nearest neighbor token in the embed-
ding space. However, a naı¨ve kNN search query
can take O(kn) time complexity, where n is the
number of embeddings in C; k is the embed-
ding dimension. To accelerate the search pro-
cess, we apply hierarchical navigable small world
graphs (SWGs) (Malkov and Yashunin, 2018) for
fast approximate kNN search. More precisely, em-
Algorithm 1: Efficient Token-level Recovery
Input: Perturbed text Xa, potential perturbations R,
estimated embeddings {ei}, small world
graphs G, token embedding corpus C.
Output: Recovered text Xr .
1 Xr = Xa;
2 for ti ∈ R do
3 index = QuerySmallWorldGraph(G, ei);
4 z = C[index].token;
5 Replace ti in Xr with z;
6 return Xr;
beddings are transformed into a hierarchical set of
SWGs based on the proximity between different
embeddings. To conduct kNN searches, the prop-
erty of degree distributions in SWGs significantly
reduces the search space of each kNN query from
O(n) to O(log n) by navigating on the graphs,
so a kNN query can be efficiently completed in
O(k log n) time complexity. Finally, the recov-
ered text Xr can be obtained by replacing the per-
turbations R in Xa as shown in Algorithm 1.
3.4 Learning and Optimization
To learn a robust discriminator, we randomly sam-
ple adversarial examples from both character-level
and word-level attacks in each training epoch. The
loss function optimizes the cross-entropy between
the labels and the probabilistic scores computed
by the logits yi and the softmax function.
The learning process of embedding estimator
is similar to masked language models. The ma-
jor difference is that language models optimize
the likelihood to generate the same original token
while the embedding estimator minimizes the dis-
tance between the derived embedding and the orig-
inal token embedding. To learn the embedding es-
timator, a size-(2w+1) sliding window is applied
to enumerate (2w + 1)-gram training data for ap-
proximating embeddings with context tokens. For
optimization, the embedding estimator is learned
to minimize the mean square error (MSE) from the
inferred embeddings to the original token embed-
dings.
To take advantage of hierarchical navigable
SWGs for an efficient recovery, although a pre-
process to construct SWGs G is required, the pre-
process can be fast. The established SWGs can
also be serialized in advance. More precisely, the
time complexity is O(kn log n) for one-time con-
struction of reusable SWGs, where n is the num-
Dataset Train Test
Length
Max. Min. Avg.
SST-2 67,349 1,821 56 1 19
IMDb 25,000 25,000 2,738 8 262
Table 1: The statistics of datasets.
Attack Type Example
No Attack Old-form moviemaking at its best.
Insertion Old-form moviemaking at its beast.
Deletion Old-form moviemaking at its be s t.
Swap Old-form moviemaking at its bets.
Random Old-form moviemaking at its aggrandize.
Embed Old-form moviemaking at its way.
Table 2: Examples of each type of attack
ber of embeddings in the embedding corpus C.
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments
to evaluate the performance of DISP in improving
model robustness.
4.1 Experimental Settings
Experimental Datasets. Experiments are con-
ducted on two benchmark datasets: (1) Stan-
ford Sentiment Treebank Binary (SST-2) (Socher
et al., 2013) and (2) Internet Movie Database
(IMDb) (Maas et al., 2011). SST-2 and IMDb
are both sentiment classification datasets which in-
volve binary labels annotating sentiment of sen-
tences in movie reviews. Detailed statistics of two
datasets are listed in Table 1.
Attack Generation. We consider three types of
character-level attacks and two types of word-level
attacks. The character-level attacks consist of in-
sertion, deletion, and swap. Insertion and deletion
attacks inject and remove a character, respectively,
while a swap attack flips two adjacent characters.
The word-level attacks include random and em-
bed. A random attack randomly samples a word
to replace the target word while a embed attack
replaces the word with a word among the top-10
nearest words in the embedding space. The ex-
amples of each attack type are illustrated in Ta-
ble 2. To obtain strong adversarial attack sam-
ples,w we consider to leverage oracle to identify
the perturbations that cause prediction changes.
Specifically, for each test sample we construct 50
adversarial examples by perturbing the test data.
We sample one example in which model predic-
tion changes after perturbing. If none of them can
Dataset Method Metric
Character-level Attacks Word-level Attacks Overall
Insertion Deletion Swap Random Embed Attacks
SST-2
SC
Precision 0.5087 0.4703 0.5044 0.1612 0.1484 0.3586
Recall 0.9369 0.8085 0.9151 0.1732 0.1617 0.5991
F1 0.6594 0.5947 0.6504 0.1669 0.1548 0.4452
DISP
Precision 0.9725 0.9065 0.9552 0.8407 0.4828 0.8315
Recall 0.8865 0.8760 0.8680 0.6504 0.5515 0.7665
F1 0.9275 0.8910 0.9095 0.7334 0.5149 0.7952
IMDb
SC
Precision 0.0429 0.0369 0.0406 0.0084 0.0064 0.0270
Recall 0.9367 0.8052 0.8895 0.1790 0.1352 0.5891
F1 0.0820 0.0706 0.0777 0.0161 0.0122 0.0517
DISP
Precision 0.9150 0.8181 0.8860 0.5233 0.2024 0.6690
Recall 0.5068 0.4886 0.5000 0.3876 0.2063 0.4179
F1 0.6523 0.6118 0.6392 0.4454 0.2044 0.5106
Table 3: Performance of SC and DISP on identifying perpetuated tokens.
change the prediction, the sample with the least
confidence is selected.
Base Model and Baselines. We consider
BERT (Devlin et al., 2018) as the base model as it
achieves strong performance in these benchmarks.
To evaluate the performance of DISP, we con-
sider the following baseline methods: (1) Adver-
sarial Data Augmentation (ADA) samples adver-
sarial examples to increase the diversity of training
data; (2) Adversarial Training (AT) samples differ-
ent adversarial examples in each training epoch;
(3) Spelling Correction (SC) is used as a base-
line for discriminating perturbations and blocking
character-level attacks. Note that ADA and AT re-
quire to re-train BERT with the augmented train-
ing data, while DISP and SC modify the input text
and then exploit the original model for prediction.
SC is also the only baseline for evaluating discrim-
inator performance. In addition, we also try to en-
semble DISP and SC (DISP+SC) by conducting
DISP on the spelling corrected input.
Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of the perturbation discriminator by preci-
sion, recall and F1 scores, and evaluate the overall
end-to-end performance by classification accuracy
that the models recover.
Implementation Details. The model is imple-
mented in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017). We set
the initial learning and dropout parameter to be
2 × 10−5 and 0.1. We use crawl-300d-2M word
embeddings from fastText (Mikolov et al., 2018)
to search similar words. The dimensions of word
embedding k and contextual representation d are
set as 300 and 768. w is set as 2. We follow
BERTBASE (Devlin et al., 2018) to set the num-
bers of layers (i.e., Transformer blocks) and self-
attention heads as 12.
4.2 Experimental Results
Performance on identifying perpetuated to-
kens. Table 3 shows the performance of DISP and
SC in discriminating perturbations. Compared to
SC, DISP has an absolute improvement by 35%
and 46% on SST-2 and IMDb in terms of F1-
score, respectively. It also proves that the con-
text information is essential when discriminating
the perturbations. An interesting observation is
that SC has high recall but low precision scores
for character-level attacks because it is eager to
correct misspellings while most of its corrections
are not perturbations. Conversely, DISP has more
balances of recall and precision scores since it
is optimized to discriminate the perturbed tokens.
For the word-level attacks, SC shows similar low
performance on both random and embed attacks
while DISP behaves much better. Moreover, DISP
works better on the random attack because the em-
beddings of the original tokens tend to have no-
ticeably greater Euclidean distances to randomly-
picked tokens than the distances to other tokens.
Defense Performance. Table 4 reports the ac-
curacy scores of all methods with different types
of adversarial attacks on two datasets. Compared
to the baseline BERT model, all of the meth-
ods alleviate the performance drops. All meth-
ods perform better on blocking character-level at-
tacks than word-level attacks because word-level
attacks eliminate more information. For the base-
Dataset Method
Attack Character-level Attacks Word-level Attacks Overall
-free Insertion Deletion Swap Random Embed Attacks
SST-2
BERT 0.9232 0.6498 0.6544 0.6774 0.5385 0.6556 0.6351
SC 0.9174 0.9082 0.8186 0.8840 0.5993 0.7003 0.7821
ADA 0.9174 0.8071 0.8071 0.8209 0.7394 0.7681 0.7885
AT 0.9186 0.8186 0.8175 0.8025 0.6935 0.7646 0.7793
DISP 0.9232 0.8278 0.8278 0.8301 0.7773 0.7784 0.8083
DISP+SC 0.9197 0.9128 0.8681 0.9060 0.7784 0.7853 0.8501
IMDb
BERT 0.9431 0.8586 0.8599 0.8568 0.8468 0.8615 0.8567
SC 0.9193 0.8834 0.8794 0.8825 0.8695 0.8753 0.8780
ADA 0.9393 0.8766 0.8765 0.8754 0.8722 0.8755 0.8752
AT 0.8998 0.8958 0.8822 0.8787 0.8886 0.8822 0.8855
DISP 0.9378 0.9310 0.9297 0.9301 0.9281 0.9347 0.9307
DISP+SC 0.9395 0.9316 0.8772 0.9313 0.8755 0.9292 0.9090
Table 4: The accuracy scores of methods with different adversarial attacks on two datasets.
lines, consistent with Table 3, SC performs the
best for character-level attacks and the worst for
word-level attacks. In contrast, ADA and AT are
comparably more stable across different types of
attacks. The differences between performance for
character- and word-level attacks are less obvi-
ous in IMDb because documents in IMDb tend
to be longer with more contexts to support the
models. DISP works well to block all types of
attacks. Compared with the best baseline mod-
els, DISP significantly improves the classifica-
tion accuracy by 2.51% and 5.10% for SST-2 and
IMDb, respectively. By ensembling SC and DISP,
DISP+SC achieves better performance for block-
ing all types of attacks. However, the improve-
ments are not consistent in IMDb. In particu-
lar, SC performs worse with lower discrimination
accuracy and over-correcting the documents. In
addition, DISP has a stable defense performance
across different types of attacks on IMDb because
richer context information in the documents bene-
fits token recovery.
Number of Attacks. Figure 4 shows the clas-
sification accuracy of all methods over different
numbers of attacks, i.e., perturbations, for differ-
ent types of adversarial attacks. Without using a
defense method, the performance of BERT dra-
matically decreases when the number of attacks
increases. With defense approaches, the perfor-
mance drops are alleveated. Moreover, the re-
lations between the performance of methods are
consistent across different perturbation numbers.
DISP+SC consistently performs the best for all of
the cases when DISP outperforms all of the sin-
Method Insertion Delete Swap
BERT 0.6498 0.6544 0.6774
DISPSST-2 0.8278 0.8278 0.8301
DISPIMDb 0.8243 0.8197 0.8278
Method Random Embed Overall
BERT 0.5385 0.6556 0.6351
DISPSST-2 0.7773 0.7784 0.8083
DISPIMDb 0.7623 0.7681 0.8005
Table 5: The accuracy of DISP over different types of
attacks on the SST-2 dataset with the tokens recovered
by the perturbation discriminator and the embedding
estimator trained on the IMDb dataset for robust trans-
fer defense. Note that DISPx indicates the framework
is established on the dataset x.
gle methods for most of the situations. These re-
sults demonstrate the robustness of the proposed
approach.
Robust Transfer Defense. In practice, we may
not have access to the original training corpus
of a prediction model. In the following, we
investigate if the perturbation discriminator can
transfer across different corpora. We first train
the discriminator and the estimator on IMDb de-
noted as DISPIMDb and then apply it to defend
the prediction model on SST-2. Table 5 shows
the experimental results of robust transfer de-
fense. DISPIMDb achieves similar performance as
the performance of DISPSST-2 trained on the same
training set. Hence, it shows that DISP can trans-
fer the ability to recover perpetuated token across
different sentiment copora.
Case Study of Recovered Text. Table 6 lists four
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Figure 4: The accuracy of methods over different numbers and types of attacks.
# Attacked Sentence Recovered Token Label Pred
1 Mr. Tsai is a very orig i nal artist in his medium, and what time is it there? imaginative positive positive
2 Old-form moviemaking at its be s t. best positive positive
3 My reaction in a word: disapponitment. that negative positive
4 a painfulily funtny ode to gbad behavior. painfully; silly; one positive negative
Table 6: A case study of recovered tokens in SST-2. Note that Label and Pred represent the ground-truth label and
the predicted label.
documents from SST-2 for a case study. We suc-
cessfully recovered the attacked words from “orig-
nal” and “bet” in the cases 1 and 2 to “imagina-
tive” and “best”. It demonstrates that embeddings
generated by the embedding estimator are robust
to recover the appropriate tokens and block ad-
versarial attacks. However, DISP performs worse
when the remaining sentence is lack of informa-
tive contexts as case 3. When multiple attacks ex-
ist, the incorrect context may also lead to unsat-
isfactory recoveries, e.g., DISP converts “funny”
to “silly” in case 4, thus flipping the prediction.
This experiment depicts a disadvantage of DISP
and demonstrates that DISP+SC can gain further
improvements.
Embedding Estimator. Although DISP is not re-
quired to recover the ground-truth perturbed to-
kens, the embedding estimator plays an impor-
tant role to derive appropriate embedding vectors
that obtain the original semantics. We first eval-
uate the performance of embedding estimator as
a regression task. The RMSE scores of estimated
embeddings are 0.0442 and 0.1030 in SST-2 and
IMDb datasets, which are small enough to derive
Method Insertion Delete Swap
DISPG 0.8773 0.8681 0.8796
DISP 0.8278 0.8278 0.8301
Method Random Embed Overall
DISPG 0.7970 0.7924 0.8429
DISP 0.7773 0.7784 0.8083
Table 7: The performance of DISP using ground-truth
and recovered tokens over different types of attacks in
SST-2. Result are in accuracy. Note that DISPG de-
notes DISP using ground-truth tokens.
satisfactory tokens. To further demonstrate the
robustness of the embedding estimator and esti-
mated embeddings, we identify the perturbations
with our discriminator and replace them with the
ground-truth tokens. Table 7 shows the accuracy
scores over different types of attacks in the SST-
2 dataset. DISP and DISPG denotes the recov-
ery performance with our estimator and gound-
truth tokens, respectively. More specifically, the
accuracy of DISPG presents the upperbound per-
formance gained by the embedding estimator. The
experimental results demonstrate the robustness of
Method Insertion Delete Swap
BERT 0.1160 0.1407 0.1806
DISP 0.5856 0.5684 0.6008
Method Random Embed Overall
BERT 0.0855 0.0817 0.1209
DISP 0.4848 0.5114 0.5502
Table 8: The accuracy scores of BERT and DISP over
different types of attacks on the CoLA dataset for the
task of linguistic acceptability classification. The accu-
racy score of BERT without any attack is 0.8519.
the embedding estimator while the estimated em-
beddings only slightly lower the accuracy of DISP.
Linguistic Acceptability Classification. In ad-
dition to the task of sentiment analysis, we also
evaluate the performance of DISP in linguistic ac-
ceptability classification. The Corpus of Linguis-
tic Acceptability (CoLA) is a binary classification
task. The goal of this task is to predict whether
an English sentence is linguistically acceptable or
not (Warstadt et al., 2018). Table 8 presents the
accuracy scores of BERT and DISP on the CoLA
dataset with one adversarial attack of each type. It
is interesting that the original BERT is extremely
vulnerable to the adversarial attacks. This is be-
cause the linguistic acceptability can be easily af-
fected by perturbations. The experimental results
also depict that DISP can significantly alleviate the
performance drops. DISP is capable of blocking
adversarial attacks across different NLP tasks.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to dis-
criminate perturbations and recover the text se-
mantics, thereby blocking adversarial attacks in
NLP. DISP not only correctly identifies the per-
turbations but also significantly alleviates the per-
formance drops caused by attacks.
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